Valparaiso University Law Review
Volume 34
Number 1 Fall 1999

pp.121-168

Fall 1999

Are We Moving in the Right Dimension? Sadducees, Two
Kingdoms, Lawyers, and the Revised Model Rules of Professional
Conduct
Susan R. Martyn

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Susan R. Martyn, Are We Moving in the Right Dimension? Sadducees, Two Kingdoms, Lawyers, and the
Revised Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 34 Val. U. L. Rev. 121 (1999).
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol34/iss1/3

This Tabor Lecture is brought to you for free and open
access by the Valparaiso University Law School at
ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Valparaiso University Law Review by an authorized
administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information,
please contact a ValpoScholar staff member at
scholar@valpo.edu.

Martyn: Are We Moving in the Right Dimension? Sadducees, Two Kingdoms, La

Tabor Lecture
ARE WE MOVING IN THE RIGHT
DIMENSION? SADDUCEES, TWO
KINGDOMS, LAWYERS, AND THE REVISED
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Susan R. Martyn"
I. THE SADDUCEES
I understand the purpose of this series of lectures, thoughtfully
endowed by Glenn Tabor, to include the bringing together of religion
and law, the discovery of intersections between morality and public life,
and the unifying of concepts of personal and public conscience. Because
I intend to say something about religion, I need to begin with a religious
text that speaks to my task. And because I am speaking to a Lutheran
gathering and am myself a Lutheran, I have chosen the text from last
1
Reformation Sunday, Luke 20:27-38:2
Some Sadducees, those who say there is no resurrection,
came to Jesus and asked him a question, "Teacher,
Moses wrote for us that if a man's brother dies, leaving a
wife but no children, the man shall marry the widow
and raise up children for his brother. Now there were
seven brothers; the first married, and died childless; then
the second and the third married her, and so in the same
way all seven died childless. Finally the woman also
died. In the resurrection, therefore, whose wife will the
woman be?

Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. B.A., St. Olaf College, J.D.
Marquette University Law School. I thank Peter Martyn, John Stumme and Robert Tuttle
for helping me with the theological portions of this article, and my colleagues on the Ethics
2000 Commission for helping me with the ramifications of the rules governing lawyer
conduct. The opinions and mistakes that remain are mine alone.
I This text is recommended for the twenty-third Sunday after Pentecost by the Revised
Common Lectionary (Consultation on Common Texts, 1992). See generally HOYT L.
HICKMAN ET. AL, THE NEW HANDBOOK OF THE CHRISTIAN YEAR: BASED ON THE REVISED
COMMON LECTIONARY (1992).

2 This and all biblical citations are from the NEW REVISED STANDARD VERSION BIBLE WITH
APOcRYPHA (1995).
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Jesus said to them, "Those who belong to this age marry
and are given in marriage; but those who are considered
worthy of a place in that age and in the resurrection
from the dead neither marry nor are given in marriage.
Indeed they cannot die anymore, because they are like
angels and are children of God, being children of the
resurrection. And the fact-that the dead are raised
Moses himself showed, in the story about the bush,
where he speaks of the Lord as the God of Abraham, the
God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. Now he is God not
of the dead, but of the living; for to him all of them are
alive.
When I heard this text read on Reformation Sunday, I immediately
thought of lawyers and of Luther's Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms.
Why lawyers? Because the Sadducees, like the Pharisees, were
religious lawyers of sorts in their day who, like us, carefully labored in
their own earthly kingdom.3 Up to this point in Luke's gospel, the
Pharisees had been presented as the religious leaders who interacted
with Jesus. 4 This text, the last in Luke where Jesus speaks to the religious
leaders of his day, is the only one where the Sadducees rather than the
Pharisees question Jesus.5
The gospels may concentrate more on the Pharisees because they
were larger in number and more popular with the people than were the
Sadducees. The Sadducees formed a much smaller Jewish priestly sect in
charge of maintaining the Temple in Jerusalem.6 They were also, like
some modem lawyers, wealthier .and more traditional than the
Pharisees. 7 The Sadducees rejected the oral tradition and the prophets,
and like some lawyers, often compromised with secular authorities,
which earned them the hatred of the Jewish people. 8 Like many modem
lawyers, the Sadducees also were part of the ruling class who cared
deeply about maintaining their own status quo. 9

See generally John Richer, Sadducees, in OXFORD COMPANION TO THE BIBLE 667-68 (Bruce
M. Metzger & Michael D. Coogan eds., 1993).
4 See, e.g., Luke 5:17,7:36-50,11:37-53,13:31,14:1,16:14, 17:20, 18:9-14.
5 See Richer, supra note 3, at 667.
6
Id.
7 Id. at 667-68.
3

8 WILLIAM BARCLAY, THE GOSPEL OF LUKE 250 (rev. ed. 1975).

9 Id.
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Luke begins his series of stories about Jesus' interactions with the
religious authorities of his day with the Pharisees, today's rough
equivalent of parish pastors. 10 He ends these encounters with the
Sadducees, or priestly religious rulers, today's very rough equivalent of
Bishops.11 Now we all know that Bishops know their Bible. And these
Sadducees, thoroughly familiar with the Torah, were arguing (as modem
lawyers often do) about who is inside or outside legal limits. 12 Like
modem lawyers (who have learned from modem law professors), they
invented a hypothetical to confound Jesus.13
If Moses said that the brothers all should marry the widow, 14 how
could God sort out the chaos that would result in heaven? This must be
proof that heaven or life after death does not exist, and therefore that the
idea of resurrection from the dead was equally ridiculous.
Jesus responded to this apparent conundrum with a dramatic
paradigm shift that illustrated the very reality the Sadducees were trying
to deny. Is He said, in effect, "there is much more you do not understand
beyond this earthly kingdom where your rules govern." 16 In fact,
because Moses heard God say, I am the God of Abraham, Isaac and
Jacob, he spoke of them as living, proving that the Torah attests to the
resurrection of the body.1 7 Jesus met the Sadducees on their own
theological and legal ground, the Torah, and defeated them.18
H. TWO KINGDOMS

Of course, the gospels call this "much more" of which Jesus spoke
"the Kingdom of God." 19 And Luther painted a vivid portrait of our
human condition when he described us as simultaneously in the human
and the Godly Kingdom.20 We stand with one leg in each, joined in the

10 See, e.g., Luke 5:17-26 (showing Jesus' first interaction with the Pharisees).

11See, e.g., Luke 17:20,18:9-14.
12 See supra note 3.
13 See supra note 4.
14 See Deuteronomy 25:5.
15 See BARCLAY, supra note 8, at 250.
16
17

Id.
Id.

18 Id. at 251.
19 See, e.g., Luke 1:33; 9:60; 17:20-21; Matthew 5:20; 6:32; 13:10.
20 HEiNPJcH BORNKAMM, LuER's DocRIE OF THE Two KINGDOMS 8 (1966).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1999

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 1 [1999], Art. 3

124

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34

middle. 21 We live in the world but are not of the world. 22 As Luther
himself put it:
There are two kingdoms, one the kingdom of God, and
the other the kingdom of the world.... God's kingdom is
a kingdom of grace and mercy, not of wrath and
punishment.
In it there is only forgiveness,
consideration for one another, love, service, and the
doing of good, peace, joy, etc. But the kingdom of the
world is a kingdom of wrath and severity. In it there is
only
punishment,
repression,
judgment,
and
condemnation, for the suppressing of the wicked and
the protection of the good.2 3
We recognize the left-hand kingdom of the world in our present
daily life. God the creator gave us this good world, but the brokenness
of sin necessitates the reality of institutions of governance that seek
justice through the administration of law and the preservation of order.
We less often recognize the right-hand kingdom of God, which
represents God's promise for our present life and for our future. God the
redeemer, revealed through the incarnation of Jesus, promises a
kingdom governed by the gospel of unconditional love and personal
sacrifice. Each of us is a united kingdom; a perfect blend of God's
infinite purpose planted in feet of clay.
What does this have to do with lawyers? Jesus treats the Sadducees
the way he might treat modern lawyers. He sees us as if we are tadpoles;
swimming around the bottom of a murky pond completely unaware that
the life that waits for us outside of the water has already begun. 24 We
lawyers, like the Sadducees, swim in the darkness of human life, arguing
in the earthly kingdom over the details of human rights and
responsibilities. Our secular work often blinds us to the kingdom of God
in and beyond these murky waters. We too easily forget that we reside
in the kingdom of God as well as the kingdom of the world, and that we

21
22

Id.
Id.

2 See An Open Letter Concerning the Hard Book Against the Peasants, in A COMPEND OF
LUTHER'S THEOLOGY 213 (Hugh Thomson Kerr, Jr., PH.D. ed., 1966) [hereinafter An Open
Letter].
24 1 owe this insightful analogy to Gregory P. Sammons, rector at St. Michael's in the Hills
Episcopal Church, Toledo, Ohio.
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have a responsibility to trust God to reveal the promise of that kingdom
as well.
Jesus called the Sadducees and he calls us to understand that God
gives us "fresh eyes" to see and reveal God's kingdom as we live out our
earthly existence in the kingdom of the world. 25 But how do we do this?
How do we recognize the light of God's kingdom in the midst of the
darkness of human sin?
Of course, the idea that it is possible, though not easy, to appreciate
the kingdom of God while living in the earthly realm is an ancient one,
directly traceable to our Jewish roots, especially to the Hebrew prophets.
Micah in particular reminds us:
He has told you, o mortal, what is good; and what does
the Lord require of you but to do justice, and to love
26
kindness, and to walk humbly with your God?
The Sadducees did not believe in the prophets. 27 They viewed their
Hebrew tradition as encompassed by the Torah and nothing else.28 They
therefore missed, as we often do, the prophetic voice that calls us to learn
the lesson of God's kingdom.
Luther explained that God's kingdom "comes to us in two ways." 29
It is already here, in time among us, as well as coming, with the return of
Christ. 3° Christians live in both kingdoms simultaneously, and owe
allegiance to the power of both. 31 God's kingdom comes to us first "of
itself," because it already reigns in the kingdom of the world as a
temporal present reality. 32 We therefore should not shirk power and
responsibility in the secular world, because that kingdom also has been
given by God to serve creation.33 In this sense, our prayer that God's

25

See Stanley Hauerwas, Christian Practice and the Practice of Law in a World Without

Foundations,44 MERCER L. REV. 743,749 (1993).
26 Micah 6:8.
27 See supra note 3.
28 Id.

See The Second Petition, in THE BOOK OF CONCORD:
THE CONFESSIONS OF THE
EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH 427 (Theodore G. Tappert trans. & ed., 1959).
29

3

Id.

31

Id.

32 Id.

CARL E. BRAATEN, THE FUTURE OF GOD- THE REVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICs OF HOPE 148
(1969).
33
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kingdom should come 34 becomes a plea for resuscitation
transformation of our own life and work.

and

At the same time, because we have been created and redeemed by
God, we are called to more than a secular purpose. We reside in this
kingdom of God, but it also represents a hidden realm, known only
through the eye of faith. It redeems the world by bringing grace and
forgiveness and calls us to the power of God's rule. Living in God's
kingdom means expecting "an eternal priceless treasure," 35 that is "like
an eternal inexhaustible fountain, which, the more it gushes forth and
overflows, the more it continues to give." 36 Luther describes God as
angry if we do not ask for enough and demand it confidently. 37
What does this mean for us, as we lawyers labor with the details of
human dilemmas, and daily encounter the reality of human potential
and human deceit? Put more simply, how do we discover, in the midst
of daily life, if we are moving in the right direction?
III. THE RIGHT DIMENSION

Asking this question suggests the need to rethink it. To ask whether
we are moving in the right direction implies that these kingdoms are two
dimensional, and that they are located in separate places. It also
suggests that we possess the redemptive power that God alone deploys.
This is exactly the mistake behind the Sadducees' question that got them
into so much trouble with Jesus and eventually silenced them. They
thought categorically and two-dimensionally, and their thinking limited
the source of their belief. But Jesus answered them in a completely
different dimension, far beyond their circumscribed imaginations. He
showed them that they spoke, reasoned, and thought like children; that
they knew in part but certainly did not understand fully.3 8
If we are to follow the lead of Jesus, we should avoid the trap of
asking the wrong question. We should attempt to start in the right place
by questioning the categories we have created and the dimension we are
thinking about. We should not ask whether we are moving in the right
direction, but, in attempting to follow the lead of Jesus, we should ask

3

Matthew 6:10.

3

See THE BOOK OF CONCORD: THE CONFESSIONS OF THE EVANGELUCAL LUTHERAN CHURCH

427 (Theodore G. Tappert trans. & ed., 1959).
36

Id.

Id. at 428; see also supra note 23.
nI Corinthians13:11-12.
37
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whether we are moving in the right dimension.39 Put another way, we
should ask whether we are aware of and responding to the promise of
the kingdom of God as we pursue the details of the kingdom on earth.
This responsibility creates an unrelenting tension and paradox,
acknowledged by Luther. 40 We are to live in the world but not be of it.
We need to keep getting further and further involved in the details of
life, but we also need to continually fear losing meaning by failing to
trust God's presence. How do we live with the reality of law and order
and the demands of understanding and advising where the legal lines
are drawn, while simultaneously responding to the radical call of the
gospels to love the Lord our God with all our mind and our neighbors as
ourselves? 41 Without understanding the right dimension, we risk either
asking too little of the world or relying on it to provide too much.
H. Richard Niebuhr called the Lutheran method of handling the
dynamic between the two kingdoms "Christ and Culture in Paradox."' 2
Lutherans recognize the obligation to obey the commands of both
kingdoms, even though their norms may conflict, because the question
about the relationship between Christ and Culture is not one we put to
ourselves, but one God puts to us. 43 All social arrangements need to use
reason and power to control evil, but this same secular power also
enables the strong and powerful to maintain and perpetuate their sinful
state.44
The culture to which we belong, though a gift of God to restrain sin,
also is "godless and sick unto death." 45 But the miracle of God's grace
forgives us and sustains us in this same secular world, calling us not to
escape it. God has blessed us with both political institutions in the left-

See Robert Benne, Lutheran Ethics: Perennial Themes and Contemporary Challenges, in THE
PROMISE OF LuTHERAN ETHics 11, 23 (Karen L. Bloomquist & John R. Stumme eds., 1998).
40 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
41 Matthew 22:37-41.
In Matthew, this is the second admonition to the Sadducees,
immediately following the question about the resurrection in Matthew 22:23-33. In the
parallel text in Mark, this answer is given to a "scribe," again immediately after the
Sadducee's question about the resurrection. Mark 12:28-31. In the Luke parallel, a "lawyer"
asks Jesus the question about eternal life that elicits this response. Luke 10:25-28.
42 H. RICHARD NIEBU-R, CHRIST AND CULTURE 149-89 (1951).
39

43

Id. at 185.

Roger Cramton makes this same observation about the value system implicit in Legal
Education. See Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J.
LEGAL ED. 247 (1978); see also Roger C. Cramton, Beyond the Ordinary Religion, 37 J. LEGAL
44

ED. 509 (1987).
45 NIEBUHR, supra note 42, at 156.
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hand kingdom that promote order and peace and punish wrongdoing,
and grace on the right hand that enables us to recognize our own sin and
obey secular law that serves the love of neighbor. The reality of our
daily life is a continuing dynamic struggle with God, with "divine
victories that look like defeats" and "human defeats that turn into
victories." 46
This is why Lutherans are not bothered by working in the world,
because we tend to think about law and social institutions as "dykes
against sin." 47 Niebuhr praised Luther's brutal honesty about the reality
of our daily life because "it mirrors the actual struggles of Christians
who live 'between the times,' and who in the midst of this dynamic must
live by a secular ethic while ardently hoping for the new ethic of the
kingdom of God." 4 8

At the same time, however, Niebuhr criticized the Lutheran model
for being too culturally conservative. 49 Though responsible to work in
the left-hand kingdom, we can become too comfortable in it and
therefore see little need to change the world we live in. Karl Barth
agreed, and criticized Lutherans in the 1930's, because their theology
seemed to justify complete unthinking adherence to tyrannical secular
authority.50 As Lutheran theologian Carl Braatten puts it, the Achilles'
heal of the two kingdoms doctrine is its failure to recognize an
eschatological dynamic of the gospels: "The problem with the twokingdom doctrine is that the revolutionary dynamic discharged by the
kingdom on the right hand did not set off any explosion in the kingdom
on the left hand."5 '
It is true that Lutherans have not always responded well to this
challenge. Professor Benne calls this view that the secular world and the
spiritual are two different spheres a "Lutheran heresy,"5 2 because it
treats the two kingdoms as entirely separate realms. Yet, Luther himself
seemed to insist on such a view in some of his work.- Perhaps this is

Id. at 158.
Id.at 188.
48 Id. at 185.
49 Id. at 187-89.
50 NIEBUHR, supra note 42, at 187-89.
4

47

51 BRAATEN, supra note 33, at 147.
52

Benne, supranote 39, at 22.

53 PAUL ALTHAUS, THE ETHics OF MARTiN LUTHER 51 (Robert C. Schultz trans., 1972)

(describing Augustine's influence). See also Gospel Sermon, Twenty-third Sunday After Trinity
in A COMPEND OF LUTHER's THEOLOGY 214 (Hugh Thomson Kerr, Jr., PH.D. ed., 1966) ("The
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because Luther was principally concerned in the sixteenth century with
emphasizing the need to put the church back under the rule of God's
gospel.5 4 To do this, he needed to emphasize the distinctions between
the earthly and godly realm. But at the same time, Luther maintained
that distinguishing the two kingdoms served primarily as a reminder
that God "rules the world in a two-fold way." 5
While there is no doubt Luther was less than perfect like the rest of
us, he was correct that we need to clarify and distinguish the two
kingdoms so that we do not confuse them. If we confuse the two
kingdoms, we risk characterizing political machinery designed to curb
human sinfulness as a structure of the kingdom of God. If we do this,
we blind ourselves, as the Sadducees did, to the brilliant reality of the
kingdom discerned by faith, and fail to challenge our society to serve
others. 56 Luther himself fell into this trap near the end of his life, when
he advocated violence against the Jews of his day.57 The magnitude of
his mistake has only recently been acknowledged by Lutherans who
have publicly apologized and recognized Luther's anti-Semitism as "a
contradiction and an affront to the Gospel, [and] a violation of our hope
and calling."5 8

two powers or governments, God's and Caesar's, or spiritual and temporal kingdoms,
must be kept apart, as Christ does here...."); A similar sermon states:
We have often said that the Gospel or kingdom of God is nothing else
than a state or government, in which there is nothing but forgiveness
of sins. And wherever there is a state or government in which sins are
not forgiven, no Gospel or kingdom of God is found there. Therefore
we must dearly distinguish these two kingdoms from each other ....

Gospel Sermon, Twenty-second Sunday After Trinity, in A COMPEND

OF LUTHER'S THEOLOGY

207 (Hugh Thomson Kerr, Jr., PH.D. ed., 1966).
54 William H. Lazareth, Sentinels for the Tricentennial, in THE LEFT HAND OF GOD: ESSAYS
ON DIscIPLESHIP AND PATRIOTISM 113,128 (William H. Lazareth ed., 1976).
55 ALTHAUS, supra note 53, at 45.
56 Niebuhr may have succumbed to this temptation in his chapter entitled Christ the

Transformerof Culture. See NIEBUHR, supranote 42, at 190-229.
For an account of Luther's attitude toward the Jews, see ROLAND BAINTON, HERE I
STAND: A LIFE OF MARTIN LUTHER 379-80 (1950).
58 Declaration of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America to the Jewish Community
(April 18, 1994) (on file with the author). The full text of the statement reads:
DECLARATION OF THE EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH
IN AMERICA TO THE JEWISH COMMUNITY
The Church Council of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America on April
18, 1994, adopted thefollowing document as a statement on Lutheran-Jewish
relations:
In the long history of Christianity there exists no more tragic
development than the treatment accorded the Jewish people on the
57
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But in distinguishing the two kingdoms, we also must guard against
separating them, or we may become tempted to segment our lives as
well. One ethic at work, another at home.5 9 To do this would be to deny
the Jesus of history who dwelt among us, and who revealed the kingdom
of God in his everyday existence. Segmenting the kingdoms deprives
part of Christian believers. Very few Christian communities of faith
were able to escape the contagion of anti-Judaism and its modem
successor, anti-Semitism. Lutherans belonging to the Lutheran World
Federation and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America feel a
special burden in this regard because of certain elements in the legacy
of the reformer Martin Luther and the catastrophes, including the
Holocaust of the twentieth century, suffered by Jews in places where
the Lutheran churches were strongly represented.
The Lutheran communion of faith is linked by name and
heritage to the memory of Martin Luther, teacher and reformer.
Honoring his name in our own, we recall his bold stand for truth, his
earthy and sublime words of wisdom, and above all his witness to
God's saving Word. Luther proclaimed a gospel for people as we
really are, bidding us to trust a grace sufficient to reach our deepest
shames and address the most tragic truths.
In the spirit of that truth-telling, we who bear his name and
heritage must with pain acknowledge also Luther's anti-Judaic
diatribes and the violent recommendations of his later writings against
the Jews. As did many of Luther's own companions in the sixteenth
century, we reject this violent invective, and yet more do we express
our deep and abiding sorrow over its tragic effects on subsequent
generations. In concert with the Lutheran World Federation, we
particularly deplore the appropriation of Luther's words by modem
anti-Semites for the teaching of hatred toward Judaism or toward the
Jewish people in our day.
Grieving the complicity of our own tradition within this
history of hatred, moreover, we express our urgent desire to live out
our faith in Jesus Christ with love and respect for the Jewish people.
We recognize in anti-Semitism a contradiction and an affront to the
Gospel, a violation of our hope and calling, and we pledge this church
to oppose the deadly working of such bigotry, both within our own
circles and in the society around us. Finally, we pray for the continued
blessing of the Blessed One upon the increasing cooperation and
understanding between Lutheran Christians and the Jewish

community.
Id.
5 Niebuhr labeled this dilemma "Christ Against Culture." See generally NIEBUHR, supra

note 42, at 45-82. As applied to modem lawyers, Joseph Allegretti incorrectly envisions the
Lutheran lawyer as one who "hopes that it is possible to be both [a good lawyer and a good
Christian] but fears that it is not." JOSEPH G. ALLEGRETI, J.D., M. Div., THE LAWYER'S
CALLING:

CHRISriAN FArrH AND LEGAL PRACTICE 18 (1996) (emphasis in original).

He

believes that the duty to obey the now and the not yet leaves the Lutheran lawyer
psychologically uneasy. Id. Maintaining a moral equilibrium between the two kingdoms is
difficult at best, and often tempts the lawyer to segment them. Id. Cf. Thomas L. Shaffer,
On Living One Way in Town and Another Way at Home, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 879 (1997).
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the secular world of another perspective and encourages us to escape
rather than wrestle with the moral complexity of the kingdom of the
world.
We need to heed the words of another prominent twentieth-century
theologian, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who understood the need for this
radical dynamic and, consequently, was executed by the Nazis for his
role in attempting to undermine the secular order. While imprisoned, he
said, "it is only by living completely in this world that one learns to have
faith.... By this-worldliness I mean living unreservedly in life's duties,
problems, successes and failures, experiences and perplexities." 6°
Luther should be credited for advocating that "responsible Christian
life means participation in all difficult and controversial areas of human
existence.... Christians... are warned not to abandon the power structure
but to infiltrate it."61 This means, first, that we should "study where
[our] influence can make a difference," and, second, that we should
"manifest Christian love and genuine good works in our station in
life." 62 Calling government to be true to its God-given purpose, the
pursuit of justice, may even include active resistance to a law or a
government, as Bonhoeffer and Martin Luther King, Jr. believed.6
Luther's insight calls me to reflect on my own presence in both
kingdoms in the twentieth and soon to be twenty-first centuries. 64
Understanding that I live in both kingdoms calls me to recognize and
articulate in the earthly kingdom its God-given eschatological potential.
"Moving in the right dimension" means recognizing that my secular
tasks are human but that, at the same time, my vocation is God-driven.
It also means being accountable to God and relying on God's forgiveness
in both kingdoms.

60 DIEmIcH BONHOEFFER, LETTERs AND PAPERs FROM PRISON

193 (Eberhard Bethge ed., rev.

ed. 1953).
61 GEORGE W. FORELL, THE AUGSBERG CONFESSION:

A CONTEMPORARY COMMENTARY 70

(1968).
62
63

Id. (quoting part of Article XVI (On Civil Government) of the Augsburg Confession).
See Thinking in Terms of Two Spheres, in DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, ETHIcS 196-207 (Eberhard

Bethge ed., 1965); Martin Luther King, Jr., LETTER FROM THE BIRMINGHAM JAIL (1994). See
also James M. Childs, Jr., Ethics and the Promise of God: Moral Authority and the Church's
Witness, in THE PROMISE OF LUTHERAN ETHics 101 (Karen L.Bloomquist & John R. Stumme

eds., 1998).
64 In the twentieth century, unlike the sixteenth, our chief emphasis may not be calling the

church back to God's gospel on the right hand, but calling society back to God's law on the
left. See generally Lazareth, supranote 54.
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We Lutheran Christians know that we are not justified by good
works, that faith alone makes them possible. 65 At the same time, we
know that faith calls us into the world, to serve others and glorify God in
our ordinary places of responsibility. We need more courage to voice the
truths we recognize, not just with fellow Christians in the biblical
language of God's kingdom, but also to all in a secular tongue. The laws
I advocate or administer are simultaneously a testimony to the goodness
of creation and the depravity of human selfishness. Jesus' encounter
with the Sadducees and Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms calls me
to question, in the midst of this process, whether I am moving in the
right dimension.
IV. LAWYERS
I propose this question about the right dimension and a tentative
answer to it as the means to examine my own work in legal ethics,
generally, and, more specifically, my work as part of a thirteen-member
commission called "Ethics 2000."
In April 1997, the American Bar Association's President, N. Lee
Cooper, President-elect, Jerome J. Shestack, and President-elect
Nominee, Philip S. Anderson, created a Special Commission to Evaluate
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. We were instructed to "(1)
conduct a comprehensive study and evaluation of the ethical and
professionalism precepts of the legal profession; (2) examine and
evaluate the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the rules
governing professional conduct in the state and federal jurisdictions; (3)
conduct [original] research, surveys and hearings; and (4) formulate
recommendations for action."6
We also were told that our
recommendations "will have a far reaching impact on the legal
67
profession into the year 2000 and beyond."
To date, we have defined our mission as maximal consideration,
minimal change. That is, we are fairly happy with the current
organization and much of the content of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. We are in the process of examining the range of rules adopted
by the various jurisdictions, cleaning up meaning and reorganizing

65

FORELL, supra note 61, at 86.

66 Memorandum from the Office of the President to the ABA Board of Governors (April

15, 1997) (on file with author).
67 Letter from N. Lee Cooper, Jerome J. Shestack and Philip Anderson (June 9, 1997) (on
file with the author).
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where necessary. We plan to offer a new code with clearer language,
better explanation and a few new rules not considered before. But I am
also happy to report that despite, or perhaps because of, our minimalist
tendencies, we also are in the process of suggesting some major changes
in the substance of some of the rules that govern lawyer conduct. I invite
you to join me in assessing whether these changes suggest a move in the
right dimension, a move toward realizing the love of God present in both
kingdoms.
I find help in understanding the answer to the question whether we
are moving in the right dimension in the Micah text that I mentioned
earlier. The prophet insisted that we do justice, love kindness and walk
humbly with our God. Each of these admonitions adds another
dimension to my search for guideposts that help me understand the
meaning of my life in both kingdoms.

V. "Do JUSTICE"
The Matthew parallel text to the story of the Sadducees is
immediately followed by another question from a "lawyer": "Teacher,
which commandment in the law is the greatest?" Jesus' answer provides
the ethic of the kingdom of God: "You shall love the Lord your God
with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind...
[and] ... your neighbor as yourself."6 This love commandment governs
and encompasses both kingdoms. 69 But it is expressed differently in
each kingdom. In the right hand kingdom of God, it means sacrifice and
suffering. In the left hand kingdom of the world, love means protecting
the weak and using coercion to restore order and justice.
Of course, volumes have been written in both theological and secular
texts about justice. For example, John Rawls tells us that justice is
fairness, and then takes 500 pages to describe it.70 For Luther, the answer
was easier: God is synonymous with justice. Luther pointed out that
"anyone who knows the Ten Commandments perfectly knows the entire

Matthew 22:37-41. In the parallel text in Mark, this answer is given to a "scribe," again
immediately after the Sadducee's question about the resurrection. Mark 12:28-31. In the
Luke parallel, a "lawyer" asks Jesus the question about eternal life that elicits this response.

Luke 10:25-28.
BORNKAMM, supra note 20, at 9.
70 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
6

See also READING RAWLS: CRITICAL

STUDIES ON RAWLS' A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Normal Daniels ed., 1974).
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Scriptures." 7' He also believed that human reason naturally understands
these commandments because God has created us with them "naturally
written in the mind."72 In particular, the first commandment, "You shall
have no other gods," means to trust only in God and to boast of no other
god, be it great learning, wisdom, power, prestige, family or honor.
Seeking help or comfort in our own works "presumes to wrest heaven
from God."73 Each of us must fight the temptation to trust or flaunt our
earthly talents and seek rather to put them to God's service.
In the left-hand kingdom of the world, doing justice means curbing
destiuctive and unfair behavior. Here, Luther believed that Christians
could and should learn in this world from those skilled in administering
secular realms. Administering justice means first learning its secular
language, and then seeing its deeper purpose within the kingdom of
God. The world of law demands persons of integrity and also requires
that we be "wise, sagacious, brave and fearless." 74 We need these
characteristics because administering justice often will "offend good
friends, relatives, neighbors and the rich and powerful."
There can be no doubt that Christians, Lutherans, lawyers and
citizens also agree that justice is the goal, and often agree about the
values that should count. We often disagree, however, about which
principle of justice or morality or legal policy best serves a particular
group of persons.
Take liberty, in the sense of freedom from
governmental interference, and life. We likely agree that both are
important, perhaps even fundamental. But in both the abortion and
right to die debates, conscientious disagreement has produced real line
drawing dilemmas.7
Similar debates have occurred before the Ethics 2000 Commission
and have made us wrestle with the same tough policy and line drawing
issues. I invite you to assess whether we are drawing better lines than

Preface to the Large Catechism, in THE BOOK OF CONCORD: THE CONFESSIONS OF THE
EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH 361 (Theodore G. Tappert trans. & ed., 1959).
72 Apology to the Augsburg Confession, in THE BOOK OF CONCORD: THE CONFESSIONS OF THE
EVANGEUCAL LUTHERAN CHURCH 108 (Theodore G.Tappert trans. & ed., 1959) [hereinafter
71

Apology].
73 The First Commandment, in THE BOOK OF CONCORD
THE CONFESSIONS OF THE
EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH 367 (Theodore G. Tappert trans. & ed., 1959).
74 The Eighth Commandment, in THE BOOK OF CONCORD: THE CONFESSIONS OF THE
EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH 400 (Theodore G.Tappert trans. & ed,, 1959).
75 See, e.g., Susan R. Martyn & Henry J. Bourguignon, Physician-AssistedSuicide: The Lethal
Flaws of the Ninth and Second Circuit Decisions,85 CAL. L. REv. 371 (1997).
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previous rule drafters have proposed, lines that promote client service
but at the same time curb unfair and destructive behavior.
To start, consider the long cherished ethic of client confidentiality.
Most lawyers consider it gospel that client confidences be kept. Why?
Two reasons usually are given. First, it works. That is, the assurance of
confidentiality encourages otherwise hesitant or reluctant clients to tell
all. This enables lawyers to counsel about legal limits (i.e., prevent
illegal acts) and to prepare adequate defenses concerning past
misbehavior. Without the assurance of confidentiality, clients would not
speak freely and lawyers would lack the facts we need to do our job. 76 A
second, less consequentialist justification is not as often articulated, but
in the minds of many, is at least as significant. Confidentiality is
important because it is essential to the trust required by the client-lawyer
relationship. Without trust, a client never will be able to rely on the
advice or services of a lawyer because the client always will fear that the
lawyer acts in someone else's best interest.7
The duty of confidentiality has been recognized formally in all
lawyer codes since 190878 Prior to that, the obligation to keep

See, e.g., In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Monroe H. Freedman, PersonalResponsibility in a ProfessionalSystem, 27 CATH. U. L. REV.
191 (1978).
78 The original ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, first adopted by the American Bar
Association in 1908, included one terse off-handed reference to confidences in Canon 6,
which concerned adverse influences and conflicting interests:
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not
to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent
acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters
adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which
confidence has been reposed.
76

77

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION: OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND
GRIEvANCES WITH THE CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND THE CANONS OF JUDICIAL
ETHICS 3 (rev. ed. 1957) [hereinafter ABA CANONS). Canon 37, added in 1923, made the

obligation explicit:
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This duty
outlasts the lawyer's employment, and extends as well to his
employees; and neither of them should accept employment which
involves or may involve the disclosure or use of these confidences,
either for the private advantage of the lawyer or his employees or to
the disadvantage of the client, without his knowledge and consent,
and even though there are other available sources of such information.
A lawyer should not continue employment when he discovers that'this
obligation prevents the performance of his full duty to his former or to
his new client.
Id. at 36.
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confidences was recognized in the attorney-client privilege.79 In 1969,
the American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional
Responsibility made clear that the confidentiality obligation
encompassed both the attorney-client privilege and "other information
gained in the professional relationship."80 Lawyers were told they could
be disciplined if they revealed either kind of client confidences; in
addition, they could be disciplined if they used them to the disadvantage
of the client or for the advantage of someone else. 81 Since 1981, the
American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct have
prohibited a lawyer from revealing "information relating to the
representation,"8 2 and from using it to the disadvantage of the cient.83
What ethical principles can ever justify breaching such a trust, one at
the heart of the client-lawyer relationship? Three come to mind: life,
fraud, and self-defense. All three justify current exceptions, and all three
justifications have formed the foundation for expanding exceptions to
confidentiality in the Commission's work.
A. L ife

The first ethical principle, life, has justified breaches of
confidentiality in many professions.84 For lawyers, this was first
officially recognized in Canon 37, which provided that "[tihe announced
intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the
confidences which he is bound to respect."85 Known as the "future
crime" exception, this provision granted a lawyer whose client confided
an intention to kill the power to warn the victim or the police. The Code
of Professional Responsibility restated this exception by allowing, but
not requiring, the lawyer to disclose "the intention of the client to
commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime." 86
The Model Rules narrowed this exception, granting a lawyer discretion
to disclose client confidences only for a "criminal act that the lawyer

79 See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHicS 242-43 (1986).
80 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITy DR 4-101(A) (1969) [hereinafter ABA
CODE].

81 See id. at DR 4-101(B).
92 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUcT Rule 1.6 (1981) [hereinafter ABA MODEL
RULES]
83 See id. at Rule 1.8(b)
S4 Psychiatrists have received the most attention. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Board of Regents,
551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
85 ABA CANONS, supra note 78, at 36.
86 ABA CODE, supra note 80, at DR 4-101(C)(3).
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believes is likely to result in death or serious bodily harm."87 This
sharpened the focus but left out other client acts such as torts, which
might cause death or serious bodily harm, but were not criminal.
After a long debate over the past ten years, the American Law
Institute's Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers adopted a
broader view: that lawyers who receive any information from clients
indicating a reasonably certain threat of serious bodily harm or death
may disclose or use the information to prevent the harm.ss The rationale
for this exception, long advocated by Professor Monroe Friedman,89 "is
based on the overriding value of life and physical integrity." 90 The
Restatement takes this position despite the fact that only three current
lawyer codes allow such broad discretion, 91 and only a few judicial
decisions even mention the issue. 92 The drafters were persuaded that
87

ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 82, at Rule 1.6(b)(1).

88 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §117A (Proposed Final Draft

No. 2, 1998) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 1998]. Section
117A, Using or DisclosingInformation to Prevent Death or Serious Bodily Harm, provides:
(1) A lawyer may use or disclose confidential client information
when the lawyer reasonably believes such use or disclosure is
necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or serious bodily
harm to a person.
(2) Before using or disclosing information pursuant to this Section,
the lawyer must, if feasible, make a good faith effort to persuade
the client either not to act or, if the client or another person has
already acted, to warn the victim or take other action to prevent
the harm and, if relevant, to advise the client of the lawyer's
ability to use or disclose pursuant to this Section and the
consequences thereof.
(3) A lawyer who... takes action or decides not to take action
permitted under this Section is not, solely by reason of such
action or inaction, subject to professional discipline, liable for
damages to the lawyer's client or any third person, or barred from
recovery against a client or third person
Id.
89 Id.; see also MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYER'S ETHICS 102-04 (1990)
90 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 1998, supranote 88, at § 117A cmt. b.
91 See FLORIDA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-1.6(b)(2) (West 1999) (providing
that a lawyer shall reveal information relating to the representation of a client "to prevent
death or substantial bodily harm to another"); ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT
Rule 1.6(b) (West 1999) ("A lawyer shall reveal information about a client to the extent it
appears necessary to prevent the client from committing an act that would result in death
or serious bodily harm."); NORTH DAKOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a)
(West 1999) (providing that revelation or use of client information is "required to the extent
the lawyer believes necessary to prevent the client from committing an act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or imminent substantial bodily harm").
92 See, e.g., People v. Fentress, 425 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1980); Hawkins v. King County, 602 P.2d
361 (Wash. Ct. App 1979).
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this is the "better view" because "it seems highly unlikely that a court
would impose discipline or other liability on a lawyer in [such] an
instance, should the lawyer act reasonably, even in a way that prejudices
the client, to remove the threat to life or body." 93 Thus, there is no
requirement that the act be one of the client, or that the threatened act be
criminal, as long as the lawyer has a reasonable basis for believing
94
disclosure of client information is necessary to prevent the harm.
The first example used to illustrate this rule is based on Spaulding v.
Zimmerman,95 a case where opposing counsel in a personal injury case
learns from his expert witness that the injured party unknowingly
suffers from a life-threatening aortic aneurysm. No one was about to
commit a crime, but a human life could be saved if the opposing lawyer
breached client confidentiality.96 The Minnesota Supreme Court granted
a motion to reopen the judgment after these facts later came to light, but
97
only because the plaintiff was a minor at the time of the settlement.
The Restatement provision would allow disclosure whether or not the
person is a minor, even though current rules do not.
The second example, taken from a more recent case, Purcell v. District
Attorney,98 involves a client who does intend a crime. He seeks legal
advice about an eviction, and in the process discloses that he intends to
burn down the apartment building. The Massachusetts Court found that
the lawyer clearly had discretion to disclose to prevent the crime. It also
decided that the same lawyer might be able to quash a subpoena seeking
his testimony in a subsequent criminal proceeding. 99
The other two examples are not taken from cases, but were often
referred to in debates during the drafting process. The first envisions a
lawyer who learns from engineers of a client corporation that a toxic
substance has just been released into the city's water supply. The lawyer

93 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 1998, supra note 88, at § 117A cmt. b.
94 Id. at § 117A cmt. c.

95 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962).
%' Id.
97 Id. For a complete discussion of the Spaulding case, see Roger C. Cramton & Lori P.

Knowles, Professional Secrecy and Its Exceptions: Spaulding v. Zimmerman Revisited, 83
MINN. L. REv. 63 (1998).
98 676 N.E.2d 436 (Mass. 1997).
" See Susan R. Martyn, The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers and the Courts, 1997
PROFESSIONAL LAWYER, 115, 124 (symposium issue).
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may disclose to prevent harm, even if the authorized agents of the
corporation refuse to release the information. 10
When the Ethics 2000 Commission took up this rule, we were
persuaded by the rationale of the Restatement, even though few
jurisdictions had yet adopted such a rule in their lawyer code. 10 1 Our
proposed exception to Model Rule 1.6 provides: "A lawyer may reveal
information relating to the representation of a client or former client to
the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm." 1°2

RESATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 1998, supra note 88, at § 117A cmt. c,
illus. 3.
101Ten jurisdictions require disclosure if the client intends to commit a crime that would
result in serious bodily harm or death. Id. at § 117B reporter's note at 192-93. See also supra
notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
102 MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.6 (Public Discussion Draft Mar. 23,
1999). [hereinafter Ethics 2000 Public Discussion Draft]. The entire rule reads:
CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client or a former client unless the client gives
informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order
to carry out the representation, or the disclosure is permitted by
paragraph (b) or required by paragraph (c).
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of
a client or a former client to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm;
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is
likely to result in substantial injury to the financial interests
or property of another and in furtherance of which the client
has used or is using the lawyer's services;
(3) to rectify or mitigate substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another resulting from the client's
commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the
client has used the lawyer's services;
(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with
these Rules; or
(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a
defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer
based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the
lawyer's representation of the client.
(c) A lawyer shall reveal information relating to the representation of
a client or a former client to the extent required by law or court
order or when necessary to comply with these Rules.
10D
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Our discussion of this exception to the general obligation of
confidentiality also encompassed another example, raised some time ago
by Professor Friedman: the innocent person on death row. 103 What
should a lawyer do if a client confesses to a crime that another has been
convicted of? As drafted, this exception would allow the lawyer to
disclose to save a life, or even to free an innocent person, if that person's
incarceration threatens substantial bodily harm.
This extension of a narrow exception to confidentiality moves in the
right dimension, for two reasons. First, it elevates a truly important
principle, life, over another not quite so important one, trust. There can
be no doubt that the kingdom of the right hand brings life; that is the
point of Jesus' response to the Sadducees. Nor can there be any doubt
that this message is central to the Gospels. Further, the occasions when a
lawyer might be in the position to save life and cannot convince a client
to do something about it probably are few. As a profession, we have
moved from narrow-minded categories (the client must intend a future
crime) to responsible premises (life matters more than client trust).
Finally, to the extent that society encourages dangerous people to seek
legal advice, lawyers may actually be in the best position to counsel, and
if that fails, to warn about serious harm. The license society has given us
puts us in this position and certainly can be read to allow us to breach
confidentiality responsibly if serious harm likely will occur. 104
B. Fraud
The idea that client fraud might justify a departure from client
confidentiality first was articulated in the attorney-client privilege. 105 A
client who sought legal advice for the purpose of committing a crime or
fraud was not deserving of the privilege if her lawyer later were asked to
testify about the matter. The official lawyer codes first recognized this
notion in Canon 15 in 1908.1 6 The original ABA Canons also recognized

103 Id.

See also Freedman, supra note 77, at 103.

This may be one justification for the view of psychotherapists, at the time of Tarasoff,
that they could warn of dangerous behavior by a patient if "it bec[ame] necessary in order
to protect the welfare of the individual or of the community." See Tarasoff v. Board of
Regents, 551 P.2d 334,347 (Cal. 1976).
105See generallyWOLFRAM, supra note 79, at 279.
106ABA CANONS, supra note 78, at 13. Canon 15, entitled How Far a Lawyer May Go in
Supporting a Client's Cause, warned against frivolous law suits and admonished lawyers to
perform their duties within the bounds of the law. It provided in part:
The lawyer owes 'entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of
104
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a specific kind of client fraud that would justify disclosure: a fraud on
the court that amounted to perjury. 1°7 Canon 41, added in 1951, went
further. If a lawyer "discovers that some fraud or deception has been
practiced, which has unjustly imposed upon the court or a party," the
lawyer should seek to rectify it, first by encouraging the client to do so,
and if that proves unsuccessful, by "promptly inform[ing] the injured
1°8
person or his counsel, so that they may take appropriate steps."
These provisions have continued to provoke heated controversy for
at least the past half-century. 1°9 The original provision in the ABA Code
followed Canon 41.110 In 1974, DR 7-102 (B)(1) was amended by adding a
clause that reversed the duty to disclose."1 But most jurisdictions did
not adopt this amendment.
When the Model Rules were debated, this issue received extended
attention. The Kutak Commission recommended that lawyers be
required to rectify frauds on courts as well as frauds on third parties
outside of court proceedings, even if disclosure of client confidences was
necessitated. Proposed Model Rule 3.3 required lawyers to take

his utmost learning and ability,' to the end that nothing be taken or be
withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied.
Id.

107See

id. at 26. Canon 29, entitled Upholding the Honor of the Profession, provided in part.
"The counsel upon the trial of a cause in which perjury has been committed owe it to the
profession and to the public to bring the matter to the knowledge of the prosecuting
authorities." Id.
10 Id. at 39.

109See, e.g., Hinds v. State Bar of California, 119 P.2d 134, 137 (Cal. 1941); ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 287 (1953); ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987).
110See ABA Code, supra note 80, at DR 7-102(B). As originally promulgated in 1969, DR 7102(B) provided:
A lawyer who receives information dearly establishing that (1) His
client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon
a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the
same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the
fraud to the affected person or tribunal. (2) A person other than his
client has perpetrated a fraud upon a tribunal shall promptly reveal
the fraud to the tribunal.
Id.
"I The clause read:
"except when the information is protected as a privileged
communication." See ABA CODE, supra note 80, at DR 7-102(B)(1). The ABA Ethics
Committee later construed "privileged communication" to include all client confidences
protected by DR 4-101, whether or not protected by the attorney-client privilege. ABA
Comm. On Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1953).
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"reasonable remedial measures" to rectify frauds on tribunals, 112 and
proposed Model Rule 4.1 required disclosure of client confidences if
"necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client." 113
The ABA House of Delegates accepted the first duty to tribunals but
rejected the second. 114 The result was Model Rule 3.3 that requires a
duty to rectify, including the duty to disclose fraud on tribunals." 5 In all
other situations, Model Rule 4.1 subordinates the duty of candor to the
116
obligation of confidentiality.
Responding to a number of amendments that were offered to
circumscribe the duty to rectify frauds on tribunals, Robert W. Meserve,
chairman of the Commission, said: "The shield of confidentiality cannot
become a sword by which a client accomplishes through a lawyer what
the law would forbid the client himself, nor must it be a shackle
hopelessly entwining a lawyer as co-conspirator in a seriously criminal
scheme."" 7 This argument carried the day in the context of public
frauds on tribunals, where participants and press alike might notice.118
Similar arguments did not persuade the same lawyers, however, in
private contexts away from public view, such as negotiation and
counseling clients. 119 The Kutak Commission recommended that a
lawyer could reveal client confidences to prevent "substantial injury to
the financial interests or property of another," 120 and "to rectify the
consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the furtherance of
which the lawyer's services had been used." 121 Both exceptions were
defeated by the House of Delegates. 122
This left a huge problem for the Commission and for lawyers. Even
if some kind of public interest could be served by protecting client
confidences outside of litigation (like encouraging clients to be frank and
fully communicate with their lawyers), lawyers still had a long

112LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL

CONDUCr:

THEIR

DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 121-22 (1987) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE
HISTORYJ.
113Id. at 145.

14 ld. at 123-24, 147.
11 Id. at 123-24.
116Id. at 147.
117LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 112, at 122.
118Id. at 122-23.
119Id. at 146.

120Id. at 48 (discussing Rule 1.6(b)(1)).
121Id. at 49 (discussing Rule 1.6(b)(2)).

122See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 112, at 48-49,51.
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recognized obligation not to counsel or assist illegal or fraudulent
activity.1 3 The Commission recommended that this rule be maintained,
and the ABA House of Delegates agreed. 124 What should a lawyer do in
a situation where she discovers ongoing client fraud during the course of
the representation?' 25
The anti-counseling/assisting provisions meant that the lawyer
either must withdraw from the representation to avoid assisting the
12 6
fraud, or convince the client to stop the ongoing fraudulent activity. If
the lawyer chooses to withdraw, knowing that third parties may still be
relying on prior services that unwittingly aided the client fraud, can the
lawyer warn those persons? The debates suggest that the lawyer could
never allow duties of candor to trump duties of confidentiality, except

See ABA CANONS, supra note 78, at 28. Canon 32, entitled The Lawyer's Duty in Its Last
Analysis, provided in part.
No client, corporate or individual, however powerful, nor any cause,
civil or political, however important, is entitled to receive nor should
any lawyer render any service or advice involving disloyalty to the law
whose ministers we are, or disrespect of the judicial office, which we
are bound to uphold, or corruption of any person or persons exercising
a public office or private trust, or deception or betrayal of the public.
Id.
See also ABA CODE, supra note 80, at DR 7-102(A)(7) ("[In his representation of a client, a
lawyer shall not counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or
fraudulent.").
124 Model Rule 1.2 (d), as recommended by the Kutak commission, provided:
A lawyer shall not counsel or assist a client in conduct that the lawyer
knows is criminal or fraudulent, or in the preparation of a written
instrument containing terms the lawyer knows are expressly
prohibited by law, but a lawyer may counsel or assist a client in a good
faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of
the law.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 112, at 31. As adopted by the ABA House of Delegates,
12

current Model Rule 1.2 (d) provides:

A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer
may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct
with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith
effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the
law.
Id. at 33.
125 GEOFFREY

C. HAZARD

JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING:

A HANDBOOK

ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr §§ 4.1: 302,4.1:303 (1998).
176

See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992).
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before a tribunal. Yet, a "noisy withdrawal" comment was added to
Model Rule 1.6 to allow just that.127
A number of jurisdictions were not satisfied with this compromise.
They have adopted their own version of Rules 1.6 and 4.1 that parallel
the original Kutak formulation. These rules allow or require disclosure
of client confidences to prevent 28 or rectify' 29 a client fraud.
All of this background is necessary to understand the current
discussion of these issues by the Ethics 2000 Commission. In addition,
the heated and long Restatement debates on these issues had just
produced black letter that agreed with the original Kutak proposals. 13°

See Ronald D. Rotunda, The Notice of Withdrawal and the New Model Rules of Professional
Conduct: Blowing the Whistle and Waving the Red Flag, 63 OR. L. REV. 455 (1984). See also
ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 82, at Rule 1.6 ants. 14-15. Comments 14 and 15 to Model
Rule 1.6 provide:
[14] If the lawyer's services will be used by the client in materially
furthering a course of criminal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer
must withdraw, as stated in Rule 1.16 (a)(1).
[151 After withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from making
disclosure of the clients' confidences, except as otherwise
provided in Rule 1.6. Neither this rule nor Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule
1.16(d) prevents the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of
withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any
opinion, document, affirmation, or the like.
Id.
12 See, e.g., TEXAS DISCILINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr 1.05(c)(7) (West 1999)
("[A lawyer may reveal confidential information] when the lawyer has reason to believe it
is necessary to do so in order to prevent the client from committing a criminal or
fraudulent act.").
129See, e.g., MICHIGAN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuC Rule 1.6(c)(3) (West 1999) ("[A
lawyer may reveal] confidences or secrets to the extent reasonably necessary to rectify the
consequences of a client's illegal or fraudulent act in the furtherance of which the lawyer's
services have been used.").
M RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS 1998, supra note 88, at § 11TB. Section
117B, entitled Using or Disclosing Information to Prevent, Rectify, or Mitigate Substantial
FinancialLoss, provides:
(1) A lawyer may use or disclose confidential client information
when and to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes use or
disclosure is necessary to prevent a crime or fraud, and:
(a) the crime or fraud threatens substantial financial loss to a
person;
(b) the loss has not yet occurred;
(c) the lawyer's client intends to commit the crime or fraud
either directly or through a third person;
(d) the client has employed or is employing the lawyer's
services in committing the crime or fraud.
'2
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The Restatement debate was no doubt influenced and educated by the
recent travail of several large law firms who forgot their obligations to
steer clear of client fraud. Both Jones Day's representation of Lincoln
Savings and Loan 131 and Kaye Schoeler's representation of OPM, Inc.132
resulted in allegations of complicity in client fraud that eventually were
settled when the law firms agreed to pay millions of dollars in damages.
In Ethics 2000, we have picked up on these issues, and decided to
follow the Restatement, albeit with much less verbosity. We understand
that past ABA attempts to amend confidentiality rules to allow for
disclosure to prevent or mitigate fraud have fallen on deaf ears, as
recently as 1991.13
But we believe that they make sense. We also
understand that we are not alone. A majority of states (36) already allow
disclosure to prevent a fraud if it is criminal. 134 A significant minority of
the states (16) allow disclosure to rectify or mitigate harm caused by a
client fraud, whether or not a crime. 135 A few require disclosure to
prevent substantial financial harm. 36

(2)

(3)

(4)

If the loss has already occurred, a lawyer may use or disclose
confidential client information when the lawyer reasonably
believes its use or disclosure is necessary to rectify or mitigate the
loss.
Before using or disclosing information under this Section, the
lawyer must, if feasible, make a good faith effort to persuade the
client to act. If the client has already acted, the lawyer may warn
the victim or take other action to prevent, rectify, or mitigate the
loss and, if relevant, advise the client of the lawyer's ability to use
or disclose information under this Section and the consequences.
A lawyer, who takes action or decides not to take action
permitted under this Section is not, solely by reason of such
action or inaction, subject to professional discipline, liable for
damages to the lawyer's client or any third person, or barred from
recovery against a client or third person.

Id.
131See In re American Continental Corporation/Lincoln Savings & Loan Securities
Litigation, 794 F. Supp. 1424 (D. Ariz. 1992).
132For a general account of the OPM scandal, see STEPHEN FENICHELL, OTHER PEOPLE'S
MONEY: THE RISE AND FALL OF OPM LEASING SERVICES (1985).
'33 In August, 1991, the ABA House of Delegates rejected a proposal of the ABA Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility that would have allowed for
disclosure of client confidences to rectify, but not to prevent "a client's criminal or
fraudulent act in the commission of which the lawyer's services had been used."
RESTATEmENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 1998, supra note 88, at § 117B reporter's
note at 195.
'3 Id. at § 117B reporter's note at 193.
135 Id.
136Florida, New Jersey, Virginia and Wisconsin have such provisions. Id.
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The Ethics 2000's version of this exception allows but does not
require disclosure, both to prevent and to mitigate the effects of a client
fraud, irrespective of whether or not the fraud constitutes a crime. Our
proposed exception to Model Rule 1.6 provides: "A lawyer may reveal
information relating to the representation of a client or a former client to
the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent the client
from committing a crime or fraud that is likely to result in substantial
injury to the financial interest or property of another and in furtherance
of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services; or to rectify
or mitigate substantial injury to the financial interest or property of
another resulting from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in
furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's services."1 37
We believe this rule is right for three reasons. First, telling lawyers
they may but are not required to rectify puts them on notice that they
should, at a minimum, dissociate themselves from client fraud. Second,
telling them they have the discretion to do something about it allows
them the moral freedom to weigh whether the breach of trust, which has
already occurred by the client's misuse of the client-lawyer relationship,
should count more than the avoidance of harm to innocent participants.
Third, allowing lawyers to disclose may protect them from later
recrimination when third parties learn the truth. 38 This may be
especially important if third parties are continuing to rely on documents
or past statements of the lawyer, now known by that lawyer to be
false. 139
VI. "LovE KINDNESS"
Generally, we think about kindness as an attitude combined with
actions. But kindness in God's kingdom of love requires that we first
remove the mask of self-interest before we can properly respond to the
needs of others. The Sadducees asked Jesus the question about the
resurrection not only because they wanted to confound him, but also to
prove to the people and probably to the Pharisees that their attitude and
action properly reflected God's purpose. Jesus taught them to discard

Ethics 2000 Public Discussion Draft, supra note 102, at Rule 1.6(b)(2)-(3).
138See, e.g., Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974).
137

The Restatement uses an illustration roughly based on the OPM case to make this point.
A lawyer has prepared an opinion letter as part of a business transaction and later learns
that the transaction is a fraudulent one. If the letter has been used to help perpetrate the
fraud, the lawyer has discretion to warn the victim not to rely on it. RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAw GovERNiNG LAWYERS 1998, supra note 88, at § 117B cat. e, illus. 1.
139
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their own needs before coming to any conclusions about whether they
were right. Standing in the kingdom of God, replete with its grace and
forgiveness, how do we justify our own self-interest? These are good
questions for lawyers and those of us who draft lawyer codes.
A. Self-Defense
The lawyer codes that require confidentiality have long recognized
self-defense as. a competing principle. Initially, a lawyer was allowed to
respond to accusations by her client. 140 The ABA Code extended this
prerogative to defense of employees and associates and to collect a fee. 141
The Model Rules went even further. The lawyer now is allowed to
disclose information relating to the representation of a client "to
establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal
charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the
client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding
concerning the lawyer's representation of the cient." 142
To date, the Ethics 2000 Commission has left this rule alone. Most
jurisdictions have adopted it as recommended by the ABA, and it does
not seem to cause lawyers much trouble. Whether it causes clients
unnecessary trouble is another story. This may be why the Restatement
narrows the lawyer's discretion somewhat:
A lawyer may use or disclose confidential client
information when and to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes it necessary to defend the lawyer or
the lawyer's associate or agent against a charge or
threatened charge by any person that the lawyer or such
associate or agent acted wrongfully in the course of
representing a client and the information concerns a
representation whose circumstances are in dispute. 143
You might conclude that we just ran out of steam when it came to
lawyer self-defense. After all, we have provided lawyers with a lot to

140See ABA CANONS, supm note 78, at 36. Canon 37 provided in part: "If a lawyer is
accused by his client, he is not precluded from disclosing the truth in respect to the
accusation." ld.
141ABA CODE, supra note 80, at DR 4-101(C)(4).
142ABA MODEL RuLEs, supra note 82, at Rule 1.6(b)(2).
I- RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 116 (Proposed Final Draft No.
1, 1996) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 1996].
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consider about the value of life and the evil of fraud. But, we did
manage to add one more exception to confidentiality that we hope most
lawyers will find sensible and necessary. A lawyer is allowed to reveal
information relating to the representation "to secure legal advice about
the lawyer's compliance with these Rules." 144 This exception makes
explicit that a lawyer has a personal obligation to comply with
professional rules, and discretion to seek assistance in doing so.
Of course, this is a practice of long standing. 14 Under current rules,
it is justified by the client's "implied authorization." 146 However, when
the lawyer and client are at odds, it is not reasonable to imply that the
client authorizes the lawyer to disclose confidential information for the
lawyer's own sake.147 This exception makes clear that the lawyer may do
so. We hope it will encourage lawyers to seek help when they need it,
and to advise clients in accordance with legitimate boundaries on both
the lawyer's and the client's behavior.
Are these exceptions in the service of self-interest justified? I think
they are. The purpose of the self-defense justification generally is to
allow a falsely accused lawyer to explain her behavior. While the
kingdom of God may require sacrifice, the lawyer in the worldly
kingdom should not have to serve jail time or pay a huge judgment if
innocent or not involved in a client's unlawful schemes. 14 Further,
clients should not be protected from "honest claims for legal fees." 149
The new exception to seek legal advice is justified for a different
reason. Often, this advice will be sought so that the lawyer can better
serve the client, by keeping confidences or avoiding conflicts of interest.
To that extent, the lawyer's self-interest in avoiding discipline (or a
malpractice suit) serves the client's. To the extent that the lawyer seeks
advice to learn more about the appropriate limits to advocacy, the
client's interests may not served. But when this occurs, the client may be
threatening harm to a third party that either the lawyer should advise

144Ethics 2000 Public Discussion Draft, supra note 102, at Rule 1.6(b)(4).
145 See, e.g., Drew G. Kershen, The Ethics of Ethics Consultation,PROFESSIONAL LAWYER, MAY
1995, at 1.
146 See ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 82, at Rule 1.6(a). Kershen argues that lawyer selfdefense also justifies the practice. See Drew Kershen, Further Thoughts on the Ethics of Ethics
Consultation,PROFESSIONAL LAWYER, 1997 Symposium, at 7.
147 See Lee A. Pizzimenti, Ethical Consultation From a Client Perspective, PROFESSIONAL
LAWYER, 1997 Symposium, at 21.
148 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 1996, supra note 143, at § 116.
149 See id. at § 117 cmt. b.
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against, or at a minimum, stay out of. Seeking advice may help the client
realize his better self, just as it may spur the lawyer to recognize
appropriate fiduciary duty.
B. Fiduciary Duty
The law has long provided remedies and rules to help those in
positions of trust to avoid self-interest. Those who, like lawyers, serve as
agents for another, have what the law calls fiduciary duties of obedience,
confidentiality, and loyalty to the principals or clients they serve. 15° The
agent who faces any conflicting interest that might dilute loyalty must
disclose that interest to the principal, who can decide whether to
151
continue the relationship monitoring the interest or find a new agent.
The lawyer codes have recognized these duties to inform and seek
the consent of a client. The Canons labeled the representation of
conflicting interests "unprofessional" and required "express consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts." 152 Canon 37
likewise recognized a client consent exception to confidentiality. 153 The
Code of Professional Responsibility enlarged on this duty, by requiring
consent of a client "after full disclosure" before a lawyer could disclose
confidential information or undertake a representation despite a conflict
of interest.1 4 The Model Rules translated this consent after full
disclosure obligation into "consent after consultation." 1 55 The latter term
means that the lawyer has communicated "information reasonably
sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter
in question."1M
The Model Rules also added a more general black letter provision,
entitled Communication, that generally protected the interests of clients
"in knowing what was happening." 157 The new rule (Model Rule 1.4)
responded to the fact that disciplinary complaints often involved a

150 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 376-409 (1958).
151See id. at § 387; RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 1996, supra note 143, at

§ 202.
See ABA CANONS, supra note 78, at 3.
id. at 36.
154 See ABA CODE, supra note 80, at DR 4-101(C)(1), DR 5-101(A), DR 5-104(A), DR 5-105(C),
DR 5-107(A).
15 See ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 82, at Rules 1.6(a), 1.7(a)-(b), 1.8(b), (f), (g), (i), 1.9(a)(b).
156Id. at terminology [2] (defining consult or consultation).
157 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 112, at 37.
152

153 See
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lawyer's failure to communicate and the imposition of such fiduciary
duties by courts.'- It also paralleled the developing law of informed
consent in another profession, medicine.15 9
The Restatement expands on this notion, by including in the
lawyer's obligation a duty to keep a client reasonably informed, a duty to
"consult with a client to a reasonable extent" about important decisions,
and a duty to explain a "matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation." 160
The Ethics 2000 Commission, attempting to provide a uniform
definition that accurately describes all of these developments, has
proposed the following definition of "Informed Consent", which is
intended to replace the "consent after consultation" language of the
Model Rules.
"Informed Consent" denotes the agreement of a person
to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has
communicated reasonably adequate information and
explanation regarding the material risks of and
reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course
161
of conduct.
This requirement of informed consent will appear throughout the
revised model rules. It will take on special prominence when required to
legitimate disclosure of confidential information relating to the
representation of a client,162 and to legitimate representations by lawyers
where certain conflicts of interest exist.
With respect to conflicts of interest, Canon 6, entitled Adverse
Influences and Conflicting Interests, initially provided that "It is the duty of
a lawyer at the time of the retainer to disclose to the client all the
circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest in or
connection with the controversy, which might influence the client in the

Id. Model Rule 1.4 (a) provides: "A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for
158

information." ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 82, at Rule 1.4(a).

15See Susan R. Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307,
333-40 (1980).
161

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 1996, supra note 143, at § 31.
Ethics 2000 Public Discussion Draft, supra note 102.

162

See, e.g., id. at Rule 1.6.

160
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selection of counsel."'6 It went on to require "express consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts" to validate the
representation of conflicting interests.164
The ABA Code collected conflict of interest rules in Canon 5. DR5(joint
101
(regulating personal conflicts of interest), 5-105
representations), and 5-107 (third party conflicts) all required the consent
of a client "after full disclosure" to validate a representation affected by a
conflicting interest. Model Rule 1.7 translated this requirement to
"consent after consultation." 165
In addressing conflicts of interest, Ethics 2000 has taken two
additional steps. First, we have tried to make clear that consents to
conflicts of interests only validate a representation when they are legally
allowed. In other words, some conflicts so affect the lawyer's judgment
and role that courts have found them non-consentable. Second, we
recommend that the rest of the country follow the lead of California,
Washington and Wisconsin, where client consents to conflicts of interest,

ABA CANONS, supra note 78, at 3.
16 Id. Canon 38 also regulated conflicts due to the interests of third party non-clients. It
163

provided:

"A lawyer should accept no compensation, commissions, rebates or other

advantages from others without the knowledge and consent of his client after full
disclosure." Id. at 38.
15 See ABA MODEL RuLEs, supranote 82, at Rule 1.7(a)(2), (b)(2). Rule 1.7 provides:
Conflict of Interest: General Rule
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own
interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation
of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the
consultation shall include explanation of the implications of
the common representation and the advantages and risks
involved.
Id. at Rule 1.7.
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when allowed, it must be reduced to a writing.166 Our recommended
language provides:
Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest: General Rule
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall
not represent a client if the representation involves a
conflict of interest. A conflict of interest exists if
(1)

the representation of one client will be directly
adverse to another client; or

(2)

there is a significant risk that the representation
of one or more clients will be materially limited
by that lawyer's duties to another client or to a
former client or by the lawyer's own interest or
duties to a third person.

(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a conflict of
interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may
represent a client if each affected client gives
informed consent in writing and
(1)

the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer
will be able to provide competent and diligent
representation to each affected client;

(2)

the representation is not prohibited by law; and

(3)

the representation does not involve the
assertion of a claim by one client against
another client represented by the lawyer in the
same litigation.

Note that proposed Rule 1.7, unlike any of its predecessors, 167
separates the issue of consentability from the issue of consent. This
clarifies the three-step process courts require for all conflicts. First, a
lawyer must recognize, categorize and describe the conflict. Second, the
lawyer must determine whether or not the conflict is consentable. And

166See, e.g.,

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA Rule 3-310
(West 1999); WASHINGTON RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7(a)(2), (b)(2) (West
1999); WISCONSIN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7(a)-(b) (West 1999).
'6 See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
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finally, if client consent is allowed, the lawyer must obtain it
competently. 168
The most obvious example of a non-consentable conflict is any
attempt to represent opposing parties in litigation, because the lawyer's
duty to contend for one point of view directly conflicts with her
responsibility to the opposing party. This rule extends to contested
divorces in nearly every jurisdiction, as well as uncontested dissolution
of marriage actions in most. In the latter situation, courts have been
concerned with the personal animosity that accompanies most marriage
breakups. Other family relationships also prevent joint representation.
For example, the American Bar Association Committee on Professional
Ethics recommends that lawyers decline to represent both biological and
adoptive parents in an adoption proceeding. 169

This organization follows from Section 202 of the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING
entitled Client Consent to a Conflict of Interest,which provides:
(1) A lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a conflict of
interest prohibited by § 201 if each affected client or former client
gives informed consent to the lawyer's representation. Informed
consent requires that the client or former client have reasonably
adequate information about the material risks of such
representation to that client or former client.
(2) Notwithstanding the informed consent of each affected client or
former client, a lawyer may not represent a client if.
(a) the representation is prohibited by law;
(b) one client will assert a claim against the other in the same
litigation and if the lawyer will represent both clients with
respect to that claim; or
(c) in the circumstances, it is not reasonably likely that the
lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to
one or more of the clients.
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 1996, supra note 143, at § 202; see also Fred
C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts of Interest, 108 YALE L J.407 (1998).
169 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 87-1523 (1987); see
also ALABAMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.8(k) (1999). Alabama Rule 1.8(k)
168

LAWYERS,

provides:

In no event shall a lawyer represent both parties in a divorce or
domestic relations proceeding, or in matters involving custody of
children, alimony or child support, whether or not contested. In an
uncontested proceeding of this nature a lawyer may have contact with
the non-represented party and shall be deemed to have complied with
this prohibition if the non-represented party knowingly executes a
document that is filed in such proceeding acknowledging(1) that the lawyer does not and cannot appear or serve as the lawyer
for the non-represented party;
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Some courts have added some non-litigational representations to the
list of non-consentable conflicts. These include the joint representation
of parties to a complex real estate transaction.170 In all of these situations,
a lawyer must recognize the conflict and decline any joint representation.
In all others, the nature of the conflict must be reduced to a writing that
adequately explains the matter to the client, followed by the client's
agreement before the representation can continue.
We have added the requirement that, where allowed, consents to
conflicts be in writing to protect both clients and lawyers. Clients benefit
because the writing requirement forces lawyers to articulate the nature of
the conflict with some degree of specificity. The client also gains a copy
of the writing as a reminder of the conflict throughout the course of the
Understanding how the conflict may affect the
representation.
representation also helps a client monitor the lawyer's service
throughout. As the representation evolves, the client can raise additional
questions about the effect of new factual or legal developments that may
diminish or exacerbate the conflict. In short, a writing provides the client
with a continual reminder of information that allows the client to
monitor and control the ongoing course of the representation.
Some concern has been expressed to the Ethics 2000 Commission
that a writing requirement might be too onerous for lawyers. In
particular, the Commission has questioned whether it might unduly
burden lawyers in small firms or solo practitioners. Some of the
California lawyers who have testified in public hearings deny that this
They indicate that, although the
has occurred under their rule.
requirement initially required some amount of drafting by lawyers,
eventually they crafted language for typically recurring conflicts. 171 The
issue boils down to whether the increased disclosure to clients mandated

(2)
(3)

(4)

that the lawyer represents only the client and will use the
lawyer's best efforts to protect the client's best interests;
that the non-represented party has the right to employ counsel of
the party's own choosing and has been advised that it may be in
the party's best interest to do so; and
that having been advised of the foregoing, the non-represented
party has requested the lawyer to prepare an answer and waiver
under which the cause may be submitted without notice and such
other pleadings and agreements as may be appropriate.

Id.
v. Bachenberg, 655 A.2d 1354,1357-60 (N.J. 1995).
See RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA Rule 3-310
(West 1999). Of course, the fact sensitive nature of many conflicts will necessitate
continued customization of some client consent forms.
170Petrillo
17
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by a writing requirement outweighs the danger of discipline where a
writing has not been provided but adequate disclosure and consent has
otherwise occurred.
Further, the process of reducing a client consent to a conflict to a
writing has created an unintended positive consequence. Being forced to
articulate the nature of a conflict has encouraged lawyers to be diligent
in recognizing and responding to conflicts, some of which may have
been ignored in the past. If properly executed, written consent also gives
an extra measure of protection to lawyers when clients decide to
continue the representation. A client's inquiry about the conflict may
remind the lawyer about avoiding the competing interest, thereby
preventing harm to client interests and obviating subsequent
disciplinary complaints 72 or malpractice suits.'7' Written consents also
serve as continual reminders to clients that the issue was discussed
previously, especially when a conflict continues throughout the
representation.
Ethics 2000 also recommends that written consents be required for
some specific personal conflicts of lawyers. Courts have been especially
concerned about lawyers who engage in business deals with clients,
because the client expects the lawyer to protect his interests at exactly the
time the lawyer is most tempted to serve her own. This danger has long
been recognized. Initially, Canon 11, although titled Dealing with Trust
Property, actually provided more generally that a "lawyer should refrain
from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or
takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client." 174
The ABA Code explicitly extended this prohibition to business
transactions with clients. DR5-104(A), entitled Limiting Business Relations
with a Client, prohibited lawyers from entering into business transactions
with clients "if they have differing interests therein and if the client
expects the lawyer to exercise his professional judgment therein for the
protection of the client, unless the client has consented after full
disclosure." 1 5 Cases construing this section made clear that full
See, e.g., In re Horine, 661 N.E.2d 1206 (Ind.1996); In re Humen, 586 A.2d 237 (N.J. 1991);
Florida Bar v. Clark, 513 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 1986).
173 For two cases where consent was properly obtained, see Stroud v. Beck, 742 P.2d 735,
738-39 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987), and Dillard v. Broyles, 633 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
For a case where consent was not properly obtained, see Hill v. Okay Constr. Co., 252
N.W.2d 107, 113 (Minn. 1977).
174ABA CANONS, supra note 78, at 10.
15 ABA CODE, supra note 80, at DR5-104(A).
17
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disclosure required informing the client of the advisability of seeking
independent legal advice concerning the transaction, as well as full
disclosure of the details of the deal and the lawyer's interest in it.176
The Model Rules codified these developments in Rule 1.8(a), which
required that three criteria be met before the transaction could pass
muster. First, the terms of the transaction had to be objectively "fair and
reasonable" to the client and fully disclosed in writing "in a manner
which can be reasonably understood by the cient." 17 Second, the client
must be afforded "a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of
independent counsel in the transaction." 178 Finally, the client must give
written consent to the transaction and its terms. 17
The Restatement re-articulated these three obligations, clarifying that
the client must be informed of both the terms of the transaction and the
lawyer's role in it, and that the client's consent must be to the "lawyer's
role in the transaction." 180
When Ethics 2000 addressed this matter, we were warned that this
rule continues to evade lawyer comprehension. We were urged to
clarify further the exact requirements of disclosure, fairness of the
transaction, and client consent. The problem is this. Lawyers who spot
a "too good to be true" opportunity suddenly become reluctant or
unable to protect client interests in the transaction. Lawyers who loan or
borrow money to or from a client or who obtain an interest in a client's
business enterprise need to understand that their potential gain must be

176
See, e.g., Monco v. Janus, 583 N.E.2d 575,581-82 (111. Ct. App. 1991).
17 ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 82, at Rule 1.8(a)(1).
178 Id. at Rule 1.8(a)(2)
17 Id. at Rule 1.8(a)(3).
18 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 1996, supra note 143, at § 207. Section
207, entitled Business TransactionBetween Lawyer and Client, provides:
A lawyer may not participate in a business or financial transaction
with a client, except a standard commercial transaction in which the
lawyer does not render legal services, unless:
(1) the Client has adequate information about the terms of the
transaction and the risks presented by the lawyer's involvement
in it;
(2) the terms and circumstances of the transaction are fair and
reasonable to the Client; and
(3) the client consents to the lawyer's role in the transaction under
the limitations and conditions provided in § 202 after being
encouraged, and given a reasonable opportunity, to seek
independent legal advice concerning the transaction.
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fully understood by the client. To make this crystal clear to lawyers, we
therefore recommend a further clarification of Rule 1.8, designed to give
lawyers even better notice about their fiduciary obligations in this
situation:
RULE 1.8 Concurrent Conflict of Interest: Specific Rules
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction
with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership,
possessory or other pecuniary interest adverse to a
client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer
acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the
client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in
writing in a manner that can be reasonably
understood by the client;
(2)

the client is advised in writing of the desirability of
seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to
seek the advice of independent legal counsel on the
transaction; and

(3)

the client gives informed consent in writing to the
essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's
role in the transaction. 181

We hope that this level of specificity reminds lawyers that selfinterest often blinds us to client service. If the client refuses a deal after
learning of the lawyer's opportunity for gain, then the lawyer will have
two choices. He can modify the terms of the transaction to make it more
advantageous to the client. Or, the lawyer can change her role in the
transaction by representing her own interests while the (now former)
client gets a new independent lawyer. Essentially, the lawyer must
either cut the client a better deal or lose the business to a less selfinterested lawyer. Given the number of situations where lawyers have
been disciplined, sued for malpractice or have lost the ability to enforce a

I' Ethics 2000 Public Discussion Draft, supra note 102, at Rule 1.8.
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business transaction with a client, this rule also should help lawyers steer
182
clear of subsequent trouble.
If business opportunity has been known to blind a lawyer to a
client's interests, another personal interest, sex, also has been
increasingly problematic. No ABA recommended lawyer code has yet
specifically addressed this problem. Yet, sexual interests, because they
are personal interests, have been generally regulated by personal conflict
of interest rules. These general provisions admonish a lawyer to
consider whether any personal interest (including a sexual interest in a
client) would abuse or take advantage of a confidence reposed by the
client1 8 or reasonably would affect the lawyer's professional judgment
on behalf of the cient'84 or reasonably would adversely affect the
representation. 18

At the time the ABA Model Rules were promulgated, ethics rules
drafted by other groups of lawyers urged more specific regulation of
lawyer-client sexual relationships. The American Trial Lawyers, for
example, recommended a rule that forbade lawyers from commencing
1 6
sexual relation with clients during the lawyer-client relationship. 8
Similarly, the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers expressed its
view that "an attorney should never have a sexual relationship with a
client or opposing counsel during the time of the representation." 187

182 See,

e.g., Sugarman v. State Bar, 798 P.2d 843 (Cal. 1990) (professional discipline); Monco
v. Janus, 583 N.E.2d 575 (Ill. App. 1991) (lawyer-client business transaction voided due to
.undue influence); Duvall v. Laws, Swain & Murdoch, P.A., 797 S.W.2d 474 (Ark. Ct. App.
1990) (civil liability).
183ABA CANONS, supra note 78, at 10.
184ABA CODE, supra note 80, at DR5-101(A).
185ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 82, at Rule 1.7(b)(1).
18 See THE ROSCOE POUND FOUNDATION, AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT Rule 8.8
(Revised Draft 1982). Rule 8.8 provides that "[a) lawyer shall not commence having sexual
relations with a client during the lawyer-client relationship." Id. The official comment
adds:
Rule 8.8 forbids a lawyer to commence having sexual relations with a
client during the lawyer-client relationship. This rule... recognizes
the dependency of a client upon a lawyer, the high degree of trust that
a client is entitled to place in a lawyer, and the potential for unfair
advantage in such a relationship. Other professionals, such as
psychiatrists, have begun to face up to analogous problems.

Id.
'8 See AMERICAN ACADEMY OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY Rule 2.16

(1985). The official comment to this rule provides:
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California was the first jurisdiction to officially regulate lawyer-client
sexual relations. Responding to cases where lawyers took serious
advantage of the emotional vulnerability of clients, 188 the California
legislature commanded the Bar to propose a rule to the California
Supreme Court. The court amended and adopted the proposal on June
13, 1992.18
Since then, a number of other jurisdictions have followed suit. They
recognize that other rules of general applicability give neither adequate
warning to lawyers nor adequate protection to clients. Most of these
new rules go further than California's regulatory approach by absolutely

Persons in need of a matrimonial lawyer are often in a highly
vulnerable emotional state. Some degree of social contact (particularly
if a social relationship existed prior to the events that occasioned the
representation) may be desirable, but a more intimate relationship may
endanger both the client's welfare and the lawyer's objectivity.
Attorneys are expected to maintain personal relationships with other
attorneys, but must be sensitive to the threat to independent judgment
and the appearance of impropriety when an intimate relationship
exists with opposing counsel or others involved in the proceedings.
Id.

18 See, e.g., McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal. App. 3d 363 (1991); Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal.
App. 3d 369 (1983).
189See RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA Rule 3-120 (West

1999). The rule provides:
Sexual Relations with Client
(A) For purposes of this rule, "sexual relations" means sexual
intercourse or the touching of an intimate part of another person
for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse.
(B) A member shall not.
(1) Require or demand sexual relations with a client incident to
or as a condition of any professional representation; or
(2) Employ coercion, intimidation, or undue influence in
entering into sexual relations with a client; or
(3) Continue representation of a client with whom the member
has sexual relations if such sexual relations cause the
member to perform legal services incompetently in violation
of rule 3-110.
(C) Paragraph (B) shall not apply to sexual relations between
members and their spouses or to ongoing consensual lawyerclient sexual relations which predate the initiation of the lawyerclient relationship.
(D) Where a lawyer in a firm has sexual relations with a client but
does not participate in the representation of that client, the
lawyers in the firm shall not be subject to discipline under this
rule solely because of the occurrence of such sexual relations.
Id. See also CAL BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6106.9 (West 1992).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1999

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 1 [1999], Art. 3

160

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34

prohibiting

lawyer-client

sexual

relationships

in

some

or

all

representations. 190

Consider, for example, a recent Delaware malpractice case where the
client alleged that her divorce lawyer repeatedly subjected her to
unwanted sexual touching and propositions.1 9' She also offered to prove
that this conduct occurred with dozens of other clients of the same
lawyer. 192 The Supreme Court of Delaware found these to be "troubling
allegations," and suggested disciplinary action. 193 They then realized
that the lawyer might not have violated their current rules.194
Our debate concerning this matter in Ethics 2000 was extensive and
vigorous. Some argued that prohibitory rules such as Minnesota's and
Utah's sweep too broadly into the private lives of clients and lawyers
and that existing rules are adequate to punish severe misconduct. 195
Because not all clients are emotionally vulnerable, they argued that
lawyer-client sex should not be presumed to stem from undue influence
or cause incompetence or lack of diligent representation. Others argued
that a specific rule is needed because general rules neither warn lawyers
of the danger of subrogating professional judgment to personal interest,
nor protect clients from blatant lawyer undue influence and abuse.
Eventually, we agreed to a rule that clearly singles out and regulates
the issue. 196 We did so in part to encourage additional public debate and
to inform lawyers that we dare not ignore this matter any longer,
especially when other professional groups severely restrict professional
autonomy in order to protect client rights.
The last area where lawyer self-interest has generated a great deal of
controversy concerns whether or not a law firm implicated by an

190See, e.g., FLORIDA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 4-8.4(i) (West 1999); NEW YORK
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(a)(7) (1999); MINNESOrA RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.8(k) (West 1994).

191Brett v. Berkowitz, 706 A.2d 509 (1998).
192Id.
19

at 515.

Id. at 515 n.23.

Id.
19 See, e.g., In re Hawkins, 695 N.E.2d 109 (Ind. 1998); In re Heard, 963 P.2d 818 (Wash.
194

1998).
19 See Ethics 2000 Public Discussion Draft, supra note 102, at Rule 1.8. Proposed Rule 1.8(h)

provides: "A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client unless a consensual sexual
relationship existed between them when the lawyer-client relationship commenced." Id.
See also STEvEN B. BISBING ET AL, SEXUAL ABUSE BY PROFESSIONALS: A LEGAL GUIDE (1995);
Robert I. Simon, Sexual Misconduct of Therapists,21 TRIAL 46 (1985).
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individual lawyer's conflict of interest may screen the affected lawyer to
avoid the conflict. Screens first appeared as a judicially created remedy
for law firms affected by the conflicts of former government lawyers.197
Courts recognized that screening the lawyer with a conflict from the rest
of the firm could prevent the current firm client from losing another firm
lawyer. They also recognized that failing to legitimate screens might
create Typhoid Mary status for lawyers who leave government service
for private practice.198
The Model Rules codified this judicial remedy by distinguishing
between the former government lawyer and her law firm and allowing
the former to be "screened from any participation" in "a matter in which
the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or
employee." 9 9

197See

Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980).

198Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Kadish v. Commodity Futures

Trading Comm'n, 548 F. Supp. 1020 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
19 See ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 82, at Rule 1.11. Rule 1.11, entitled Successive
Government and PrivateEmployment, provides:
(a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer shall not
represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the
lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public
officer or employee, unless the appropriate government agency
consents after consultation. No lawyer in a firm with which that
lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue
representation in such a matter unless:
(1) the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in
the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom;
and
(2) written notice is promptly given to the appropriate
government agency to enable it to ascertain compliance with
the provisions of this rule.
(b) except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer having
information that the lawyer knows is confidential government
information about a person acquired when the lawyer was a
public officer or employee, may not represent a private client
whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which
the information could be used to the material disadvantage of
that person. A firm with which that lawyer is associated may
undertake or continue representation in the matter only if the
disqualified lawyer is screened form any participation in the
matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.
(c) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer serving
as a public officer or employee shall not.
(1) participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated
personally and substantially while in private practice or
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Subsequently, law firms began to argue that a similar rule should
enable lawyers who move between private firms to screen off lawyers
affected by various conflicts. A few jurisdictions have amended their
lawyer codes to provide for such an exception to a lawyer's
disqualification that would otherwise be imputed to the rest of the
0
firm. 2W

The Restatement debate over this issue overshadowed much of its
other work. Not surprisingly, advocates for screens often practiced in
larger law firms where implementing them seemed more often
necessary. 2°1 Eventually, a compromise provision was struck. Affected
lawyers could be screened, but only when slightly or negligibly tainted
by a conflict. Screens were allowed, but only as a last resort and only
where whatever confidential client information the personallyprohibited lawyer has learned is "unlikely to be significant in the

nongovernmental employment, unless under applicable law
no one is, or by lawful delegation may be, authorized to act
in the lawyer's stead in the matter; or
(2) negotiate for private employment with any person who is
involved as a party or as attorney for a party in a matter in
which the lawyer is participating personally and
substantially, except that a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a
judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate
for private employment as permitted by Rule 1.12(b) and
subject to the conditions stated in Rule 1.12(b).
(d) As used in this rule, the term "matter" includes:
(1) any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a
ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy,
investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other particular
matter involving a specific party or parties; and
(2) any other matter covered by the conflict of interest rules of
the appropriate government agency.
(e) As used in this rule, the term "confidential government
information" means information which has been obtained under
governmental authority and which, at the time this rule is
applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to
the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose, and which is not
otherwise available to the public.
Id.

2w See, e.g., ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10(e) (1990); MASSACHusEris

RULEs OF PROFEIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.10(d)(e) (1998).
2m See Susan R. Martyn, Conflict About Conflicts: The Controversy Concerning Law Firm
Screens, 46 OKLA. L REv. 53 (1993).
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subsequent matter." 202 Former government lawyers, on the other hand,
may be screened regardless of the significance of the information. 20 3
The debate over screens continues before courts 2° 4 and has been
repeated in Ethics 2000.205 Our current recommendation allows screens
only for former government lawyers 20 6 or as part of a client's informed
consent to the representation. 207
VII. "WALK HUMBLY WITH YOUR GOD"
Jesus' encounter with the Sadducees forced some humility on them.
They were told to rethink the meaning of the Law of Moses as well as
their own theology. We too need to avoid legalistic and moralistic selfrighteousness. Everything we do, whether we do it poorly or well,
affects some other person whom God loves, at least as much as God

2= RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 1996, supra note 143, at § 204. Section

204, entitled Removing Imputation, provides in part.
(2) Imputation specified in § 203 does not restrict an affiliated lawyer
with respect to a former-client conflict under § 213, when there is
no substantial risk that confidential information of the former
client will be used with material adverse effect on the former
client because:
(a) any confidential client information communicated to the
personally-prohibited lawyer is unlikely to be significant in
the subsequent matter;
(b) the personally-prohibited lawyer is subject to screening
measures adequate to prevent sharing of confidential
information of the former client with any person involved in
the subsequent matter; and
(c) timely and adequate notice of the screening has been
provided to all affected clients.
Id.
2w Id. at § 204(3). Section 204 provides:
Imputation specified in § 203 does not restrict a lawyer affiliated with a
former government lawyer with respect to a conflict under § 214 if:
(a) the personally-prohibited lawyer is subject to screening measures
adequate to eliminate involvement by that lawyer in the
representation; and
(b) timely and adequate notice of the screening has been provided to
the appropriate government agency and to affected clients.
Id.
2 See, e.g., Clinard v. Blackwood, No. O1A01-9801-CV-00029, 1999 WL 976582 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Oct. 28,1999); Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Ref. Co. Inc., 688 N.E.2d 258 (Oh. 1998).
msSee generally Susan R. Martyn, Visions of the Eternal Law Firm: The Future of Law Firm
Screens, 45 S.C. L.REV. 937 (1994).
206See Ethics 2000 Public Discussion Draft, supra note 102, at Rule 1.11.
2 See id. at Rule 1.10.
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cares for you and me. 20 8 We need to stand ready to rethink our legal
rules and their meaning in light of God's kingdom. We should never be
content or comfortable with what we have achieved. God is active
through our work to preserve the goodness of creation. But we should
never forget that our task is a human endeavor, inevitably marred by sin.
We, like the Sadducees, always see dimly. As God's instruments in a
sinful world, we need to wear hubris monitors that continually alert us
to the folly of our own wisdom.
A good example of the need for humility in the work of Ethics 2000
concerns our deliberations about Model Rule 4.2, which prohibits contact
by lawyers with represented persons unless "authorized by law". 20 9 This
rule means that a lawyer must speak to a represented person only by
speaking to that person's lawyer. For example, a prosecutor concerned
that a defense lawyer has not communicated a proposed plea bargain to
a criminal defendant may not communicate with the defendant to find
out. Similarly, an insurance company lawyer who fears that the plaintiff
has not been informed by her counsel of a settlement offer may only
remind the plaintiff's lawyer, not the plaintiff about the offer.
Lawyers have long been prohibited from communicating with
adverse parties. Canon 9 originally banned communication "upon the
subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel." 210 It also
admonished lawyers not to give legal advice and "...to

avoid

everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by
counsel...." 21 1 The ABA Code retained this dual prohibition, adding
two exceptions.
A lawyer could communicate directly with a
represented party if the lawyer had the prior consent of the opposing
lawyer or if "authorized by law to do so."212 The Model Rules repeated

2N

Thomas D. Morgan, A ChristianPerspectiveon Legal Ethics, 2 J. CHRISTIAN

JURISPRUDENCE

15,19 (1980).
2" ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 82, at Rule 4.2. Rule 4.2, entitled Communication With
Person Represented by Counsel, provides: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not
communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other
lawyer or is authorized by law to do so." Id.
210 ABA CANONS, supra note 78, at 8.
211 Id.
212 ABA CODE, supra note 80, at DR 7-104. DR 7-104, entitled Communications With One of
Adverse Interest,provides:
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall
not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the
subject of the representation with a party he knows to be
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this rule, and in 1995 substituted "person" for "party." 213 The
Restatement elaborated a bit, but basically reiterated the same
214
provision.

represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the
prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or
is authorized by law to do so.
(2) Give advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer,
other than the advice to secure counsel, if the interests of
such person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in
conflict with the interests of his client.
Id.
213 ABA

MODEL RULEs, supra note 82, at Rule 4.3.

Rule 4.3, entitled Dealing with

UnrepresentedPerson, provides:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by
counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is
disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know
that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the
matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the
misunderstanding.
Id.
214 RESTATEMENT

OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 1996, supra note 143, at §§ 158-59.
Section 158 and 159 provide:
§ 158. Represented Non-Client - General Anti-Contact Rule
(1) A lawyer representing a client in a matter may not communicate
about the subject of the representation with a non-client whom
the lawyer knows to be represented in the matter by another
lawyer, or with a representative of an organizational non-client so
represented as defined in § 159, unless:
(a) the communication is with a public officer or agency to the
extent stated in § 161;
(b) the lawyer is a party and represents no other client in the
matter;
(c) the communication is authorized by law;
(d) the communication reasonably responds to an emergency; or
(e) the other lawyer consents.
(2) Subsection (1) does not prohibit the lawyer from assisting the
client in otherwise proper communication by the lawyer's client
with a represented non-client, unless the lawyer thereby seeks to
deceive or overreach the non-client.
§ 159. Definition of Represented Non-Client
Within the meaning of § 158, a represented non-client includes:
(1) a natural person represented by a lawyer; and
(2) a current employee or.other agent of an organization represented
by a lawyer.
(a) who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the lawyer
concerning the matter or who has power to compromise or
settle the matter;
(b) whose acts or omissions may be imputed to the organization
for purposes of civil or criminal liability in the matter; or
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This rule has devoured a greater number of hours in Ethics 2000 than
any other. The reason: self-interest and hubris. One group of lawyers,
those in the United States Department of Justice, have generated much,
though not all of the controversy.
For about a decade, Justice
Department lawyers have sought exemption from the anti-contact rule.
In 1989, Attorney General Richard Thornburgh instructed
Department of Justice lawyers in an internal memorandum to ignore
Model Rule 4.2 prior to criminal indictments because he deemed
undercover contacts "authorized by law" and, more generally, because
the Supremacy Clause exempted federal lawyers from state ethics rules.
215
By 1991, the first federal court disagreed.
Attorney General Janet Reno responded by seeking to transform the
Thornburgh Memorandum into an administrative regulation.2 1 6 The
final rule defined a number of contacts as "authorized by law," including
all investigations, regardless of whether or not undercover work was
required, and contacts initiated by a represented party who a court finds
"has given voluntary, knowing and informed consent." 217
Recently, the Eighth Circuit found the legal foundation for the Reno
rule nonexistent. In U. S. ex rel O'Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 218 the
Eighth Circuit held that the Department of Justice had no legal authority
to promulgate such a rule. Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the
McDade Amendment, which specifically requires Federal prosecutors to
adhere to state ethics rules. 219

(c)

whose statements, under applicable rules of evidence, would
have the effect of binding the organization with respect to

proof of the matter.
Id.

215See

United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D. Cal 1991), vacated on other grounds,
989 P.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1993).
216 See 59 Fed. Reg. 39,910 (1994) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 77).
217 See 28 C.F.R. §§ 77.6, 77.7 (1998). Judicial orders are not required when "not feasible"
and a justice department lawyer finds that there is a "substantial likelihood" that a
"significant conflict of interest" exists between the represented party and his or her lawyer.
Id. at § 77.9(a)(2).
218 United States ex tel O'Keefe v. McDonnell Douglass Corp., 132 F.3d 1252, 1257 (8th Cir.
1998). Earlier, the Supreme Court of New Mexico disciplined a federal lawyer who spoke

directly to a represented defendant when the latter initiated the communication. In re
Howes, 940 P.2d 159 (N.M. 1997). The court rejected any argument that empowered the
Attorney General to adopt policies inconsistent with state ethics requirements. Id.
219 28

U.S.C. § 530(B) (1998).
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These events have renewed the debate over exceptions to the rule in
of Ethics 2000. The Justice Department wants us to reinstate some
version of the Reno Regulation as our revised proposed rule. Justice
Department representatives have argued that enforcement of this rule
will block legitimate and necessary criminal and civil investigations.
Others, especially practicing lawyers, urge us to maintain the current
provision because it protects clients and curbs lawyer overreaching.
Most prominent are lawyers who represent large corporate entities that
are at least occasionally the subject of Justice Department investigation.
Our response, following hours of debate, reading reams of cases, and
considering a wide range of fact patterns, clearly supports the current
rule but suggests one added amendment inspired in part by the Reno
Regulation. We propose adding, in addition to the "authorized by law"
exception, a small additional amendment: a lawyer may contact a
represented person if authorized by a "court order." This means that a
particular contact with a represented person will be allowed if it has
been authorized by prior case law (for example, pre-indictment contact
with a potential grand jury target)220 or, where a lawyer has doubt about
the scope of the prohibition, by a court order preceding the contact in a
particular matter. This is precisely the kind of order that should have
been (but was not) sought in a recent case to legitimate whether
responding to a defendant who initiated a contact was voluntary,
knowing, and informed.221 A court order also might be sought in a civil
case where opposing counsel suspects that settlement offers are not
being communicated to the opposing party.
We realize that this additional exception will not satisfy some in law
enforcement, but we believe that contact not previously authorized by
case law or statute should be made only after a neutral third party is
convinced that it is warranted. Deferring to judges in tough cases may
increase administrative effort, but we believe it is worthwhile to require
those seeking contact with represented persons to justify their reasons,
and let a judge determine whether a contact initiated by an opposing
party is voluntary, knowing, and the product of true informed consent.
Have we rethought this rule enough to meet the conflicting needs of
law enforcement and individual rights? We certainly have had to wade
through some moralistic and legalist hubris to reach even this tentative

220 See, e.g., United States v. Schwimmer, 882 F.2d 22,28-29 (2d Cir. 1989).
22

See In re Howes, 940 P.2d 159 (N.M. 1997).
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conclusion. We have been urged, on the one hand, never to interfere
with the discretion of the Executive Department's authority to enforce
the law. We have been told, on the other hand, that corporate counsel
represents each and every employee at all times and in all matters.
Separating the true need for legal representation or law enforcement
from the overbroad claims of blanket protection has not been easy. For
this reason, our human endeavor may be subject to further refining. But
for the moment, it seems best to respond to the legitimate needs of law
enforcement by encouraging those who seek contact with a represented
person to ask a judge when unclear about the validity of a particular
contact.
VIII. CONCLUSION
So, is it possible to be a good Christian, even a good Lutheran and to
be a good lawyer? Luther emphatically says "yes." The kingdom of God
"lets us make outward use of the legitimate political ordinances of the
nation in which we live, just as it lets us make use of medicine or
architecture, food or drink or air."m2 Our secular tasks are human, but
our vocation is God-driven. We must never forget that we are
accountable to God and that we rely on God's forgiveness. Our faith
calls us into the world, to serve others and to glorify God in our ordinary
"places of responsibility." Moving in the right dimension means that we
need to be more attentive to doing justice, loving kindness and walking
humbly with our God in all of our everyday callings. It also means that,
in doing justice, we should never end the quest for curbing destructive
and unfair behavior. In loving kindness, we should seek to remove the
mask of individual and corporate self-interest in order to respond fairly
to the needs of others. And, in walking humbly with our God, we
should avoid legal and moral self-righteousness.
May Jesus' response to the Sadducees teach us that we all have been
given fresh eyes to see the right dimension.

m Apology, supra note 72, at 222.
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